


	P	E
Presentation	180 90, 90	178 86, 92
Exam	178 92, 86	176 88, 88



Nash Equilibria: (E, E)

Pareto Optimal: $(P, P), (E, P), (P, E)$

Social optimal: (P, P)

Price of anarchy: $\frac{180 - 176}{180} = \frac{4}{180}\%$

pair of actions where no one wants to deviate.

There exists no other pair of actions where one person is better off and no one is worse off.

Sum of rewards is maximized

Intro to Auctions

- Suppose you want to sell a single item to a bunch of people = bidders
- Each bidder i is going to bid $\$b_i$
- You need to decide:
 - who gets the item
 - how much do they pay?

1st price auction: - give to $\text{argmax}_i b_i$

- charge them b_i

2nd price: - give to $\text{argmax}_i b_i$

- now charge $\text{second them 2nd highest bid}$

all pay auctions: - give it to highest bidder
- charge everyone their bid.

rewards

Each bidder has a value for item V_i
value for each dollar $+1$

\Rightarrow if get item and pay P_i

$$\text{utility} = V_i - P_i$$

\Rightarrow if I don't get item and don't pay

$$\text{utility} = 0$$

First price auctions

You are someone who values item at V_i
what should you bid?

what should b_i be?


$$0 \leq b_i \leq V_i \quad \checkmark$$

$$\text{utility} = \begin{cases} V_i - b_i & \text{if I win} \\ 0 & \text{if I lose} \end{cases}$$

My expected utility

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} v_i - x & \text{if I win} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

↑ depends on x

$$G(x) = \text{Prob}(\text{second highest bid is at most } x)$$


$$= \text{Prob}(\text{Win if } \neq \text{bid } x)$$

$$f(x) = (v_i - x) G(x) + 0(1 - G(x))$$

"bid shading"

2nd price auctions

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} v_i - (\text{second highest bid}) & \text{if I win} \\ 0 & \text{if I lose} \end{cases}$$